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At the height of the Second World War, Hans Kelsen, one of the
world's leading proponents of the view that there exists a sharp distinc-
tion between politics and law, published an essay entitled "Recognition
in International Law: Theoretical Observations" in The American Jour-
nal of International Law.' What Kelsen meant by recognition was the
recognition of a State and its government in international law. In classic
Kelsenian fashion, he argued that "the term 'recognition' may be said to
be comprised of two quite distinct acts: a political act and a legal act. '
Political recognition, such as the establishment of diplomatic relations,
means that the recognizing State is willing to enter into a political rela-
tionship with the recognized community. But this willingness, even if
reciprocal, does not turn the community in question into a State in inter-
national law. In contrast, legal recognition is constitutive of statehood. It
is a legal conclusion-Kelsen calls it "the establishment of a fact"'-that
a community meets international legal requirements of statehood. Ac-
cording to Kelsen, "by the legal act of recognition the recognized
community is brought into legal existence in relation to the recognizing
[S]tate, and thereby international law becomes applicable to the relations
between these [S]tates."'
Contemporary accounts of recognition in international law treat rec-
ognition in declaratory terms, as an act by one State that affirms the legal
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1. Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM.
J. INT'L L. 605 (1941). Kelsen's article sparked a lively debate. See Edwin Borchard, Recogni-
tion and Non-Recognition, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 108 (1942); Herbert W. Briggs, Recognition of
States: Some Reflections on Doctrine and Practice, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 113 (1949); Philip M.
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2. Kelsen, supra note 1, at 605.
3. Id. at 607.
4. Id. at 609. One of Kelsen's contemporaries, Hersch Lauterpacht, argued in 1948
that the constitutive account yields recognitional rights and duties. See HERSCH LAUTER-
PACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1948); see also TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PRACTICE IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (L.C. Green ed., 1951) (giving a declaratory account of
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existence of another State.5 On a declaratory account, whether a State
exists in international law does not turn on whether other States recog-
nize it as a State; instead, it turns on whether it possesses the objective
attributes of a State. Despite their differences, what declaratory and con-
stitutive accounts of recognition share is the insight, eloquently
articulated by Kelsen in 1941, that international law itself supplies the
criteria for determining the international legal existence of a State. This
insight assumes renewed relevance in light of the fact that international
law increasingly structures and regulates relations between States and
individuals and groups. Numerous international legal instruments as-
sume that individuals belong to certain communities. In some
circumstances, communities themselves exist in international law-not
as States, but as international legal actors in their own right.6 In Kel-
senian terms, what criteria does international law provide to determine
the legal existence of a community that is legally distinct from the State
in which it is located?
This Essay addresses this question in the context of the evolving
status of indigenous peoples in international law. International instru-
ments vest rights in indigenous peoples, and establish indigenous
peoples as international legal actors to whom States and other interna-
tional legal actors owe legal duties and obligations. These developments
began between the First and Second World Wars, when the International
Labour Organization (ILO) began to supervise indigenous working con-
ditions in colonies. They continued after the Second World War with
ILO Conventions No. 107 and 169, which vested rights in indigenous
populations located in States that are a party to their terms. More re-
cently, the U.N. General Assembly enacted the Declaration on the Rights
5. See, e.g., Opinion No. 1 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on
Yugoslavia (Nov. 29, 1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1494, 1495 (1992) ("[T]he existence or
disappearance of the State is a question of fact; that the effects of recognition by other States
are purely declaratory."). See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 1-28 (2d ed. 2006) (detailing a comprehensive overview of the debate).
6. International organizations also possess the capacity to acquire international legal
personality. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advi-
sory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11) ("[The United Nations] is a subject of
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and ... it has ca-
pacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.").
7. International Labour Organization (ILO), Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169), June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383,
reprinted in 3 INT'L LABOUR ORG., INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS, 1977-1995 324-36 (1996) [hereinafter Convention No. 169]; ILO, Convention
Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries (ILO No. 107), June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247, re-
printed in 2 INT'L LABOUR ORG., INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, 1952-1976 99-108 (1996) [hereinafter Convention No. 107].
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of Indigenous Peoples,8 which declares that indigenous peoples possess a
wide array of rights, including the right to self-determination. It affirms
the international legal existence of indigenous peoples by recognizing
them as legal subjects, and it renders international law applicable to their
relations with States. Some of these international instruments, such as
conventions adopted by the ILO, legally bind States that are a party to
their terms. Others, like the U.N. Declaration, do not, strictly speaking,
legally bind international legal actors, but they nonetheless have diffuse
legal consequences for the development of both international and domes-
tic law.
If state recognition may be said to be "comprised of two quite dis-
tinct acts: a political act and a legal act,"9 what legal act of recognition
brings indigenous peoples into existence in international law? What cri-
teria does international law provide to determine the international legal
existence of indigenous peoples? Some international legal instruments
provide guidance on what constitutes an indigenous population or peo-
ple, but they are not explicit about what constitutes its international legal
status.' ° Others, such as the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples, specify no criteria for determining whether a community
constitutes an indigenous people in international law. In this Essay, I ar-
gue that questions regarding indigenous recognition in international law
ought to be approached in light of the nature and purpose of international
indigenous rights. Indigenous rights in international law mitigate some
of the adverse consequences of how the international legal order contin-
ues to validate what were morally suspect colonization projects by
imperial powers. Indigenous peoples in international law are communi-
ties that manifest historical continuity with societies that occupied and
governed territories prior to European contact and colonization. They are
located in States whose claims of sovereign power possess legal validity
because of an international legal refusal to recognize these peoples and
their ancestors as sovereign actors. What constitutes indigenous peoples
as international legal actors, in other words, is the structure and opera-
tion of international law itself.
I develop these claims by engaging with several issues raised by in-
digenous recognition in international law. What legal conclusions has
international law drawn from the "political fact" of indigenous peoples
in the past? What is the relationship between legal recognition of States
and legal recognition of indigenous peoples? What are the legal forms of
8. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/61295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
9. Kelsen, supra note 1, at 605.
10. For examples, see generally sources cited supra note 7 and infra note 44.
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indigenous recognition, and what ends do they serve in international
law? What role does indigenous legal recognition play in the structure
and operation of the international legal order? Part I heuristically locates
Kelsen's description of the role of recognition in a broader account of
international legal rules and principles governing the acquisition and dis-
tribution of sovereign power, and recounts how international law
validated claims of sovereign power over indigenous peoples and their
territories. Parts II and III describe developments in the ILO that led to
the gradual emergence of indigenous populations as legal actors in inter-
national law. Part IV addresses developments in the United Nations,
culminating in the recent adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples. Part V offers some theoretical observations on
the legal requirements of indigenous recognition in international law, the
relation between legal recognition of States and legal recognition of in-
digenous peoples, and the nature and purpose of international indigenous
rights.
I.
When Kelsen wrote that, "by the legal act of recognition the recog-
nized community is brought into legal existence," what he meant by
"legal existence" was international legal recognition." That is, the recog-
nized community acquires international legal status as a legal entity in
possession of legal rights in international law. It does so by manifesting
attributes that international law requires of States as legal subjects. This
is not to say that the community possesses no legal existence before or in
the absence of international legal recognition. A community could pos-
sess a legal existence by virtue of its own legal system. It could also
possess legal status by virtue of the domestic law of the State in which it
is located. What Kelsen had in mind was legal status in international law.
The legal act of recognition of a community as a State brings that com-
munity into international legal existence as a State. It possesses legal
rights not simply by virtue of its own laws or the laws of the State in
which it is located. It is no longer "located" within a State. It becomes a
State unto its own in international law, a subject of international law,
governed by international law itself, with its own juridical location in the
international legal order.
Kelsen was aware of the objection that, given that it is States them-
selves that are in the business of recognizing the existence of other
States, recognition in international law looks suspiciously more political
11. Kelsen, supra note 1, at 609.
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Indigenous Recognition in International Law
than legal. His response was that international law provides the criteria
by which a State can be said to exist, and empowers States to decide
whether these criteria have been met. It does not empower States to de-
termine the criteria themselves. For Kelsen, "a community which is to be
regarded as a State in an international law sense" must be "constituted
by a coercive, relatively centralized legal order"; manifest "a power or
authority capable of enforcing the enduring obedience of the individuals
living within a certain territory"; and "be independent, i.e., it must not be
under the legal control of another community, equally qualified as a
[S]tate."'' 2 When States establish that "a certain community fulfills these
required conditions" of statehood, they perform "the legal act of recogni-
,,13
tion.
Kelsen enlisted States as legal authorities empowered to ascertain
whether a community possesses the attributes of statehood because, for
Kelsen, facts become law when they are held as such by a competent
legal authority in a legally prescribed procedure.' 4 The value of Kelsen's
contribution lies not in which authority he regarded as performing legal
recognition-a view rightly discounted by contemporary accounts of
recognition that emphasize that the existence of a State as a subject of
international law is not dependent on recognition by other States." It lies
instead in the insight that the legal existence of a State is a conclusion
that the community in question possesses the attributes that international
law requires of States as legal subjects. 6
Although Kelsen did not use the term, what a community acquires
when it is "brought into" international legal existence as a State is inter-
national legal authority to exercise sovereign power over persons and
territory. International law distinguishes between legal and illegal claims
of sovereign power made by communities seeking international legal
status as States. Kelsen's characterization of how a political community
becomes a State in the eyes of international law sheds light on the nature
of the field itself. By legally validating some claims of sovereign power
and refusing to validate others, international law organizes international
political reality into a legal order in which certain collectivities possess
legal authority to rule people and territory. It conceptualizes certain
12. Id. at 607-08.
13. Id. at 609.
14. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
2d ed. 1967) (1960).
15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
16. This insight is also present in Kelsen's earlier writings, which display more of a
declaratory flavor on the topic. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, DAS PROBLEM DER SOUVERANITAT
[THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY] (1921).
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claims of political power as legally valid claims of sovereign authority,
legally entitling those entities-States-to govern people and territory.
In 1941, whether a community constituted a State in international
law turned on whether it manifested the attributes of a State as stipulated
by international law. But, after World War II, international law vested in
"all peoples" a right of self-determination.' 7 In exceptional circum-
stances, the right of self-determination vests sovereignty in a political
community that is not co-extensive with the population of an existing
State. By the right of self-determination, international law extended in-
ternational legal validity to myriad political projects that resulted in the
decolonization of more than seventy colonies and dependent territories.'"
Other States typically recognized the claims of sovereign statehood
made by populations that had severed their colonial ties with imperial
powers, and they did so in terms of the legal criteria that Kelsen identi-
fied as the terms by which a State can be said to exist in international
law. But, contemporary international law vests in a colonized people a
right to acquire sovereign statehood as an incident of a more general
right of self-determination, and it conceptualizes decolonization projects
aimed at acquiring sovereign independence as legally valid acts by virtue
of this right. '"
International law thus brings legal order to international political re-
ality by processing the countless claims of sovereign power that have
punctuated global politics for centuries by sorting them by a binary op-
position between legal and illegal claims of sovereignty. This has the
effect of legally including certain political communities, and legally ex-
cluding others, in a systemic and dynamic international distribution of
sovereign authority. Its systemic nature is a function of the fact that its
distributional reach envelops all States in its structure and operation,
treating all as formal equals in terms of the legal nature and scope of
their sovereign power. Its dynamic nature arises from the presence of
rules and principles that authorize reallocations of sovereignty occa-
sioned by the demise of existing States and the creation of new States by
right or recognition. These rules and principles render the distribution of
sovereignty capable of recalibration and realignment in light of new po-
litical developments deemed to possess international legal significance.
The systemic and dynamic dimensions of the distribution of sover-
eign authority in international law enable us to ask questions about the
ways in which it organizes international political reality into a legal or-
der, how and under what conditions it vests certain political projects with
17. See CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 112-14.
18. Id. at 107-31 (providing an overview of these developments).
19. Id.
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international legal significance, and the distributive outcomes that it pro-
duces. What values are promoted, and what values are compromised, by
an international legal order that conceptualizes the power to rule people
and territory as a legal entitlement that vests in certain geographically
concentrated communities in the various regions of the world? To what
extent can we speak of a just or unjust distribution of sovereign power?
What varieties of inequalities are produced-and what varieties of ine-
qualities are addressed-by an international legal architecture built on
the foundation of sovereign equality? What are the rules and principles
that determine which communities are entitled to participate in the dis-
tribution of sovereignty that international law performs?
This last question is especially relevant to indigenous recognition in
international law. Three rules or principles structure the ability of com-
munities to participate as States in the international legal order. First,
international law provides that existing States, generally speaking, are
entitled to have their territorial integrity respected by other States.0 Sec-
ond, as Kelsen so formally reminds us, it also confers legal validity on a
claim of sovereignty by a community if it meets the criteria that it sup-
plies to determine whether it constitutes a State. Third, as noted,
international law vests the right of self-determination in peoples, which,
in certain contexts, entitles a people to sovereign statehood. The first of
these three legal stances validates the status quo distribution of sover-
eignty. The second and third permitted and continue to permit its
recalibration in exceptional circumstances.
But, the legality of the existing distribution of sovereign power was
not produced simply by its operation. International law began to validate
claims of sovereign power, and thereby began to constitute international
political reality into a legal order, when European States launched ambi-
tious plans of imperial expansion and began to establish overseas
colonies. Each colonizing power viewed itself and others as entitled to
claim sovereignty to territory if it could establish a valid claim according
to doctrines that governed European imperial practice at the time.2 Some
of these doctrines, such as cession, were antecedents of contemporary
international legal principles that regulate the acquisition of sovereignty,
20. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 6, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(Dec. 14, 1960) ("Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations."); see also Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28,
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law].
21. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 5.
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but others, such as the doctrines of discovery and conquest, no longer
form part of contemporary international law."
According to the doctrine of discovery, sovereignty could be ac-
quired over unoccupied territory by discovery. 3 If the territory in
question was occupied, then conquest or cession was necessary to trans-
fer sovereign power from its inhabitants to an imperial power. However,
European claims of sovereign authority over indigenous peoples and ter-
ritory came to be understood as grounded in a legal fiction that
indigenous territory was unoccupied, or terra nullius, for the purposes of
acquiring sovereign power. In Kelsenian terms, the political fact of in-
digenous peoples possessed no international legal consequences. The
doctrine of terra nullius represented the legal conclusion that indigenous
peoples possessed no international legal existence. International law,
therefore, deemed their lands to be vacant, and neither conquest nor ces-
sion was necessary to acquire the sovereign power to rule indigenous
people and territory.
International law deemed indigenous territory to be terra nullius be-
cause European powers viewed indigenous peoples as insufficiently
similar to themselves. Again in Kelsenian terms, indigenous peoples did
not meet the criteria by which a State can be said to exist-criteria
which at the time emphasized civilization and religion. European powers
viewed indigenous peoples to be insufficiently Christian or civilized to
merit recognizing them as sovereign powers.24 In the words of Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court,
[T]he character and religion of [North America's] inhabitants af-
forded an apology for considering them as a people over whom
the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy. The
potentates of the old world found no difficulty in convincing
themselves that they made ample compensation to the inhabi-
tants of the new, by bestowing on them civilization and
Christianity, in exchange for unlimited independence.25
22. This is not to suggest that international law, or at least the principles governing the
acquisition of territory, predated the colonial encounter. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM,
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2004) (arguing that international
rules deciding which entities are sovereign, and the powers and limits of sovereignty, were
"generated by problems relating to colonial order").
23. See CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 258.
24. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (A. Pearce
Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924) (stating that international law only governs States that are "inheri-
tors of that civilization"); LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 126 (Ronald
F. Roxburg ed., 3d ed. 1912) (arguing that the law of nations does not apply to "organized
wandering tribes"); JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
136-38, 141-43 (1894) (drawing a distinction between "civilization and want of it").
25. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
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Imperial powers did not always treat indigenous peoples and terri-
tory in this way. Early colonial encounters yielded treaties between
indigenous peoples and imperial powers in many parts of the world,
which continue to structure legal relations between indigenous peoples
and States in which they are located. Throughout most of the period of
imperial expansion and colonization, however, these treaties did not pos-
sess international legal force. International law stipulates that only an
agreement between "two independent powers" constitutes a treaty bind-
ing on the parties to its terms.26 The possibility that treaties between
imperial powers and indigenous peoples might nonetheless affect the
international legal validity of imperial claims of sovereign authority over
indigenous peoples and territory was eclipsed, in any event, by the emer-
gence of the international legal fiction that indigenous territory
constituted terra nullius. Regardless of whether imperial powers had
entered into treaties with indigenous populations, international law be-
gan to validate imperial claims of sovereign power over indigenous
peoples and territories on the basis that indigenous peoples were insuffi-
ciently civilized to merit legal recognition as sovereign legal actors.
This mode of validating imperial claims of sovereign power
achieved greatest prominence in international legal circles at the turn of
the twentieth century,2" and its acceptance operated to legitimate the dis-
tribution of sovereign power retrospectively. It has since been repudiated
as a justifiable basis for the assertion of sovereign power over indigenous
peoples and their lands.2' But, its effect was to exclude indigenous peo-
ples from the international distribution of sovereignty and include them
under imperial sovereign power. This process of indigenous exclusion
and inclusion vested States with international legal authority for the
colonizing projects that they began centuries earlier. The adverse conse-
quences of these projects, which included genocide, forced relocation,
and territorial dispossession, are well known and need not be catalogued
here. Nor is it necessary to turn a blind eye to the many potential benefits
26. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-70 (5th
ed. 1998); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 268-70; OPPENHEIM, supra note 24, at 285-
86 (providing a similar, more contemporaneous formulation that declares that a treaty between
a native tribe and a State is not binding in international law).
27. See HALL, supra note 24; CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES (1922); OPPENHEIM, supra note 24;
WESTLAKE, supra note 24; see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (analyzing earlier mani-
festations).
28. See, e.g., Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39, para. 80 (Oct. 16)
("Whatever differences of opinion there may have been among jurists, the State practice of the
relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and
political organization were not regarded as terrae nullius."). See generally CRAWFORD, supra
note 5, at 257-74.
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of an international legal order that treats sovereignty as a legal entitle-
ment that it distributes among collectivities that it recognizes as States.
The important point is that this process of sovereign exclusion and inclu-
sion was not a one-shot affair, occurring some time in the distant past
when international law accepted the proposition that indigenous territory
constituted terra nullius. It is an ongoing process of exclusion and inclu-
sion to the extent that it continues to subsume indigenous populations
under the sovereign power of States not of their making.
That the international legal order continues to exclude indigenous
peoples from its distribution of sovereign power is underscored by the
role and function of the right of self-determination in international law.
Although the right of self-determination extended legal validity to claims
of sovereign independence by colonized populations, it only validated
such claims made in relation to territories geographically separate from a
colonizing power.2 9 Claims made in relation to part of the territory of a
sovereign State violated international legal commitments to the "territo-
rial integrity" of that State.30 In 1970, the U.N. General Assembly
eliminated any doubt that decolonization threatened the territorial integ-
rity of a State by declaring that the territory of a colony has "a status
separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it."'"
Known as the "blue water doctrine" because of its implication that the
right to sovereign independence vests only in colonized populations
separated by water from their parent colonial State, this geographical
condition prevented indigenous peoples located in sovereign States from
acquiring sovereign independence. International law not only excluded
indigenous peoples from the international distribution of sovereignty and
included them under the sovereign power of States not of their making; it
restricted the legal capacity to acquire sovereign independence by right
to populations not located in sovereign States.
29. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 20.
30. See, e.g., id.; see also Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 20.
31. See Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 20, at 124. The Dec-
laration indicates that
[t]he territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the
Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering
it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people
of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their fight of self-
determination ....
[Vol. 30:177
Indigenous Recognition in International Law
II.
Although international law excludes indigenous peoples from its dis-
tribution of sovereign authority and renders them subject to the
sovereign power of the States in which they live, international law also
purports to protect indigenous peoples from the exercise of sovereign
power. Contemporary international legal protection of indigenous popu-
lations formally emerged at the first Berlin Conference on Africa,
initiated in 1884 by France and Germany in an effort to stem mounting
tensions over competing imperial claims of sovereignty to various re-
gions of Africa. At the Berlin Conference, imperial powers divided up
Africa for the purposes of establishing and maintaining colonial territo-
ries and mutually recognized their claims of sovereign power to large
swathes of the continent. Conference participants also undertook to
"watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the im-
provement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being
.... ,32 As a result of the Berlin Conference, what was a justification for
excluding indigenous peoples from the distribution of sovereign
power-their perceived lack of civilization-began also to form the ba-
sis of an international legal duty borne by imperial powers to exercise
their sovereign authority in ways that improve moral and material condi-
tions in colonies under their control.33
This duty of protection was subsequently embodied in the Covenant
of the League of Nations. Members of the League undertook "to secure
just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their con-
trol. 34 It also received limited institutional form in the League's
mandates system, which applied to territories that had been annexed or
colonized by Germany and the Ottoman Empire before World War 1.35
The League's Covenant declared that these territories, "inhabited by
peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous condi-
tions of the modern world," were to be administered by "mandatories"-
sovereign States-whose administration in turn was to be supervised by
the League Council and the Permanent Mandates Commission. Man
dates were grouped into three categories depending on the degree of
their "development," which determined the extent to which they enjoyed
32. General Act of the Conference of Berlin Concerning the Congo art. 6, Feb. 26,
1885, reprinted in E. HERTSLET, 2 THE MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY 468, 473 (3d ed. 1908).
33. See SYBIL E. CROWE, THE BERLIN WEST AFRICAN CONFERENCE, 1884-85 (1970)
(1942) (describing the diplomatic history of the Berlin Conference).
34. League of Nations Covenant art. 23, para. b.
35. See generally QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(1930) (providing a contemporaneous analysis of the mandates system).
36. League of Nations Covenant art. 22.
Fall 20081
Michigan Journal of International Law
political autonomy from their mandatory powers.37 Mandatories were
responsible for the "tutelage" of peoples inhabiting mandates in accor-
dance with "the principle that the well-being and development of such
peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation .... ,38
International indigenous protection during this period, however, re-
ceived the most attention from the ILO. Soon after its inception in 1919,
the ILO sought to extend its supervisory authority to working conditions
in colonies. This initiative was met with wide-spread opposition from
colonial powers, 39 despite their pledge to "secure just treatment of the
native inhabitants of territories under their control., 4° The Constitution of
the ILO specified that Member States undertake to apply ILO conven-
tions to which they are party "to the non-metropolitan territories for
whose international relations they are responsible, including any trust
territories for which they are the administering authority .... "' The
Constitution, however, went on to relieve Member States of this obliga-
tion "where the subject-matter of the Convention is within the self-
governing powers of the territory or the Convention is inapplicable ow-
ing to the local conditions or subject to such modifications as may be
necessary to adapt the Convention to local conditions. 42 Colonial powers
quickly relied on these exceptions to avoid ILO scrutiny of working con-
ditions in their colonies and territories under their trusteeship. The ILO
responded by undertaking studies in 1921 on the working conditions in
colonies and dependent territories, establishing a Committee of Experts
on Native Labour in 1926 to formulate labor standards for workers in
these regions, and enshrining these standards in seven conventions that
came into force between 1930 and 1955.43
Unlike other ILO conventions during this period that called for ro-
bust domestic protection of international labor rights, the seven inter-war
conventions aimed at indigenous workers set out relatively weak labor
standards for the protection of workers in colonies and dependent territo-
ries. They included obligations to phase out the use of forced labor;
37. Group A was comprised of territories in the Middle East, Group B was comprised
of territories in Central Africa, and Group C was comprised of territories in South-West Africa
and the Pacific. See id. Article 22 explicitly refers to peoples in Group C as "indigenous"
populations. See id.
38. Id.; see WRIGHT, supra note 35; see also ANGHIE, supra note 22, at 115-95.
39. Luis RODRfGUEZ-PIlJERO, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POSTCOLONIALISM, AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: THE ILO REGIME (1919-1989) 24-25 (2005).
40. League of Nations Covenant art. 23, para. b.
41. International Labour Organization Constitution art. 35, para. 1, available at http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm#.
42. Id.
43. See infra note 44. See generally RODRfGUEZ-PII&ERO, supra note 39 (examining a
detailed account of the history of the ILO's studies and conventions concerning indigenous
workers).
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regulations governing the recruitment of workers that sought to mini-
mize the impact of the demand for labor on the political and social
organization of the population; requirements that employers enter into
written contracts with employees and bear certain costs associated with
relocation and transportation of workers; obligations to phase out, "pro-
gressively and as soon as possible," penal sanctions for breach of
contract; provisions specifying the maximum length or term of employ-
ment contracts; and regulations governing the use of migrant workers.
44
Meagre as they were, the actual impact of these conventions on colonial
working conditions was negligible. Only one colonial power, Great Brit-
ain, ratified all of the ILO conventions before World War II, and other
colonial powers either failed to ratify any or ratified only a few after sig-
nificant delay.45
Who constituted indigenous workers for the purposes of these inter-
war conventions had little to do with the fact that their ancestors inhab-
ited territory prior to colonization and imperial expansion. Each
convention defined an indigenous worker as "a worker belonging to or
assimilated to the indigenous population of a non-metropolitan territory"
or "dependent territory."46 Indigenous status was conditional on the legal
nature of the jurisdiction in which the population in question was lo-
cated. International indigenous protection between the two World Wars
extended to "populations living under a legal status of dependency in
44. See Convention Concerning Migration for Employment (revised) (ILO No. 97),
July 1, 1949, 120 U.N.T.S. 71, reprinted in INT'L LABOUR ORG., INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1919-1981 [hereinafter ILO CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS] 785 (1982); Convention Concerning the Maximum Length of Contracts
of Employment of Indigenous Workers (ILO No. 86), July 11, 1947, 161 U.N.T.S. 113, re-
printed in ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 854 [hereinafter Convention
No. 86]; Convention Concerning the Regulation of Written Contracts of Employment of In-
digenous Workers (ILO No. 64), June 27, 1939, 40 U.N.T.S. 281, reprinted in ILO
CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 845 [hereinafter Convention No. 64]; Con-
vention Concerning Penal Sanctions for Breaches of Contracts of Employment by Indigenous
Workers (ILO No. 65), June 27, 1939, 40 U.N.T.S. 311, reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 853; Convention Concerning the Regulation of Certain Special
Systems of Recruiting Workers (ILO No. 50), June 20, 1936, 40 U.N.T.S. 109, reprinted in
ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 837; Convention Concerning Forced
or Compulsory Labour (ILO No. 29), June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, reprinted in ILO CON-
VENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 29. Penal sanctions for breach of contract were
finally abolished in 1955. See Convention Concerning the Abolition of Penal Sanctions for
Breaches of Contract of Employment by Indigenous Workers (ILO No. 104), June 21, 1955,
305 U.N.T.S. 265, reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 856.
Forced labor was abolished in 1957. See Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced La-
bour (ILO No. 105), June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291, reprinted in ILO CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 39.
45. RODRfGUEZ-PI&ERO, supra note 39, at 36 n. 104.
46. See, e.g., Convention No. 86, supra note 44, art. l(a); Convention No. 64, supra
note 44, art. I(a).
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conditions of formal colonialism. 47 It did not extend to indigenous popu-
lations living in independent States. In the words of Luis Rodriguez-
Pifiero, "the category of 'indigenous' served as a device for the regula-
tion of the relations between the colonizer and the colonized . .
The distinctly colonial conception of indigenous rights that informed
international legal protection under the auspices of the ILO in the inter-
war period shifted dramatically after World War H. In 1957, the ILO
adopted the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention (Convention
No. 107). 9 Convention No. 107 was the culmination of a series of initia-
tives within the ILO that was begun shortly after the end of the war and
that sought to expand and deepen its policies with respect to indigenous
populations.0 Convention No. 107 defines two "tribal and semi-tribal"
populations that benefit from its protection. The first is comprised of
people "whose social and economic conditions are at a less advanced
stage" than those enjoyed by "the other sections of the national commu-
nity and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own
customs and traditions or by special laws."'" By including this category,
Convention No. 107 extended its protection to socially and economically
disadvantaged "tribal" populations that were "segregated culturally or
legally from national society, whether or not this had arisen from the
historical circumstances of colonization."5 2 The second category of tribal
populations is comprised of people "which are regarded as indigenous
on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the
time of conquest or colonisation . . . ."" Such people must "live more in
conformity with the social, economic, and cultural institutions of that
time than with the institutions of the nation to which they belong. 54 This
second category conceptualized an indigenous population as a particular
type of tribal population, distinguished by its ancestral connection to
conquest or colonization. In other words, all indigenous populations are
tribal populations, but not all tribal populations are indigenous popula-
47. RODRfGUEZ-PI1ERO, supra note 39, at 47.
48. Id.
49. Convention No. 107, supra note 7.
50. See generally RODRfGUEZ-PIRERO, supra note 39 (exploring in detail the ILO's
adoption of conventions concerning indigenous rights).
51. Convention No. 107, supra note 7, art. l(l)(a).
52. Russel Lawrence Barsh, Revision of ILO Convention No. 107, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.
756, 757 (1987).
53. Convention No. 107, supra note 7, art. l(l)(b).
54. Id.
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tions 5 What makes a tribal population indigenous, according to Conven-
tion No. 107, is a history of conquest or colonization.
Not only did Convention No. 107 conceptualize an indigenous popu-
lation as a tribal population with a history of conquest or colonization, it
dramatically reconceived indigenous populations as populations located
in "independent countries. 56 Before Convention No. 107, only members
of indigenous populations in colonies possessed international indigenous
rights. The ILO inter-war conventions provided protection to colonial
populations because the jurisdictions in which they were located did not
constitute sovereign States and instead fell under the sovereign authority
of foreign colonizing powers. After Convention No. 107, indigenous
populations were no longer co-extensive with colonial populations. Only
people who live in independent States, who "live more in conformity
with the social, economic and cultural institutions of that time than with
the institutions of the nation to which they belong," 7 and whose ances-
tors experienced colonization or conquest, possess international
indigenous rights. Convention No. 107 reoriented the focus of interna-
tional legal scrutiny of the conditions confronting indigenous peoples
from the formal colonial context to those confronting indigenous peoples
in independent States.
Convention No. 107's dramatic reconceptualization of an indigenous
population in international law occurred against the backdrop of funda-
mental changes in international legal relations between colonies and
colonizing powers. After World War II, the League of Nations' mandate
system was replaced by the U.N. Trusteeship Council, which was em-
powered to oversee the eventual decolonization of dependent territories
that were under mandatory supervision prior to the war." The Trustee-
ship Council did not possess supervisory authority over colonial
territories outside of the trusteeship system, but the U.N. Charter did es-
tablish the principle that Member States were to administer such
territories in conformity with the best interests of their inhabitants.5 9
55. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Dis-
crimination & Prot. of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Working Paper:
Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous
People, para. 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996) (prepared by Erica-
Irene A. Daes). Daes notes that Convention No. 107 "guarantees both categories of people
exactly the same rights" and, therefore, the distinction "is of no practical consequence... "
Id. But, the legal consequences are significant. Convention No. 107 defines an indigenous
population in part as a tribal or semi-tribal population that has been subject to past conquest or
colonization. See Convention No. 107, supra note 7, art. l(1)(b).
56. See Convention No. 107, supra note 7, art. l(1)(a)-(b).
57. Id. art. l(l)(b).
58. U.N. Charter arts. 75-91.
59. Id. art. 73.
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Colonial populations both inside and outside of the trusteeship system
became entitled to exercise their right of self-determination to
achieve sovereign independence. Reframing indigenous populations in
international law as collectivities in independent States as opposed to
collectivities in colonies thus resulted in two regimes of international
legal protection. The first, governing colonized populations, entitled such
populations to acquire sovereign independence as of right. The second,
governing indigenous populations, only entitled such populations to pro-
tection internal to and compatible with the sovereign authority of the
State in which they were located. 60
Within this framework, Convention No. 107 significantly expanded
the scope of international legal protection of indigenous populations be-
yond what existed in the inter-war period. While inter-war protection
represented efforts by the ILO to assert its jurisdiction to working condi-
tions in colonies and dependent territories, Convention No. 107 had a
very different orientation. Although it expressed concern about condi-
tions of employment, and required States to prevent various forms of
discrimination in the context of work,6' its scope was much more ambi-
tious than labor market regulation. Affirming that "all human beings
have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual
development in conditions of freedom and dignity,, 62 Convention No.
107 reached much deeper into the social, economic, and political life of
indigenous peoples. It enshrined a right of indigenous "ownership" of
traditional territories,63 it called for the recognition of indigenous legal
and cultural traditions, 64 and it required governments to provide indige-
nous populations with access to existing social security regimes,
adequate health services, and educational opportunities, 65 and to respect
indigenous customs, institutions, languages, and cultural differences.
6
6
Four features of Convention No. 107, however, constrained these
provisions. First, the rights and obligations enshrined in Convention No.
107 allowed for exceptions, limitations, and qualifications. As a result,
Member States had extensive flexibility in meeting its terms. For exam-
60. See RODRfGUEZ-PIgFERO, supra note 39, at 142 ("Convention No. 107 contributed to
sanction the breach between the international legal regime applying to peoples in conditions of
classic colonialism and that applying to indigenous groups living within independent states, as
promoted by the Blue Water Doctrine.").
61. See Convention No. 107, supra note 7, art. 15 (Recruitment and Conditions of Em-
ployment); see also id. arts. 16-18 (Vocational Training, Handicrafts, and Rural Industries).
62. Id. pmbl.
63. Id. art. 11.
64. See id. art. 7.
65. See id. arts. 19-20 (Social Security and Health); id. arts. 21-22 (Education and
Means of Communication).
66. See id. arts. 7-8, 23, 26.
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pie, indigenous populations are allowed to retain their own customs and
institutions, but only to the extent that they "are not incompatible with
the national legal system .... Indigenous rights of ownership of land
are to be respected "within the framework of national laws and regula-
tions. 68 Special measures are to be enacted to ensure the effective
protection of conditions of employment-again "within the framework
of national laws and regulations" 69 Social security and educational op-
portunities are to be extended "where practicable., 70 The Convention
stipulated more generally that the nature and scope of the measures to be
taken to effect its terms "shall be determined in a flexible manner, hav-
ing regard to the conditions characteristic of each country."
71
Second, Convention No. 107 cast indigenous protection primarily in
terms of non-discrimination. Although some of its measures required
States to provide indigenous populations with a measure of territorial
and political autonomy from the broader population, its primary thrust
was the elimination of discrimination against members of indigenous
populations. It referred to the social, economic, and cultural circum-
stances of indigenous populations as hindering them "from benefiting
fully from the rights and advantages enjoyed by other elements of the
population" and "from sharing fully in the progress of the national
community of which they are a part."7 It called for "national agrarian
programmes" to secure "treatment equivalent to that accorded to other
sections of the national community" with respect to the provision of land
and means required to promote development.73 It required all Member
States to "do everything possible to prevent all discrimination between
workers belonging to the populations concerned and other workers. 74 It
proscribed forced labor "except in cases prescribed by law for all citi-
zens."75 It required measures to ensure that indigenous people "have the
same opportunity to acquire education at all levels on an equal footing
with the rest of the national community."76 These and other provisions
suggest that international indigenous protection is needed more to ad-
dress discrimination between indigenous and non-indigenous people
within independent States than to secure a modicum of indigenous
autonomy from independent States.
67. Id. art. 7(2).
68. Id. art. 13(1).
69. Id. art. 15(1).
70. Id. arts. 19, 23.
71. Id. art. 28.
72. Id. pmbl.
73. Id. art. 14.
74. Id. art. 15.
75. Id. art. 9.
76. Id. art. 21.
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Third, Convention No. 107 housed both forms of indigenous protec-
tion-anti-discrimination and autonomy-in an overarching objective of
"integration." The measures it demands of government were to protect
indigenous people in "their progressive integration into the life of their
respective countries. 77 Integration is to occur based on respect for "the
cultural and religious values" of indigenous people, in recognition of
"the danger of disrupting the value and institutions" of indigenous popu-
lations without replacing them with "appropriate" and acceptable
"substitutes., 78 In this respect, the Convention distinguishes between in-
tegration and assimilation, stipulating that integration is not to occur by
"force or coercion" or by means of "measures tending towards the artifi-
cial assimilation" of indigenous people.79 Beyond these provisions, the
text offers little insight into the meaning of integration. But the concept
of integration during this period possessed broader currency in anthro-
pology and the social sciences, as well as in the ILO itself. The terms of
Convention No. 107 were consistent with a conception of integration as
an enlightened process of cultural adjustment designed to foster eco-
nomic and social development in ways that reinforce the legitimacy and
effectiveness of the national institutions of a State. 0
Fourth, Convention No. 107 comprehends international indigenous
protection in temporal and transitional terms. It conceives of tribal, semi-
tribal, and indigenous populations as communities that, because of social
and economic conditions, cultural differences, distinctive legal identities,
and historical circumstances, have yet to become integrated into the life
of their respective countries. International indigenous protection, on this
view, enables or facilitates a transition from a State of non-integration to
one of integration. For example, the Convention defines the term "semi-
tribal" as including "groups and persons who, although they are in the
process of losing their tribal characteristics, are not yet integrated into
the national community."8' Measures that provide indigenous protection
are not to be "used as a means of creating or prolonging a state of segre-
gation," and "will be continued only so long as there is need for special
protection and only to the extent that such protection is necessary." 2
Such measures should also include "policies aimed at mitigating the dif-
ficulties experienced by these populations in adjusting themselves to
77. Id. art. 2(1).
78. Id. art. 4.
79. Id. arts. 2(2)(c), 2(4).
80. See RODRfGUEZ-PIRERO, supra note 39 (providing an extensive analysis of the
meaning of integration in Convention No. 107).
81. Convention No. 107, supra note 7, art. 1(2).
82. Id. art. 3(2)(a)-(b).
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new conditions of life and work."83 They should protect indigenous insti-
tutions, persons, property, and labor "so long as the social, economic and
cultural conditions of the populations concerned prevent them from en-
joying the benefits of the general laws of the country to which they
belong."' 4
III.
In 1989, the ILO adopted a revision of Convention No. 107, entitled
the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independ-
ent Countries (Convention No. 169).85 Convention No. 169, in the words
of James Anaya, "is a central feature of international law's contemporary
treatment of indigenous peoples' demands. 86 Much of its prominence is
due to the degree to which it departs from the orientation and commit-
ments of Convention No. 107. Absent from Convention No. 169 is any
reference to "integration" as an objective of international indigenous
protection. Also absent is any intimation that the rights and obligations it
enshrines are temporary measures whose significance wanes as the so-
cial, economic, and political conditions of indigenous people improve
over time. Some of the rights and obligations contained in Convention
No. 107 are reiterated in Convention No. 169, but they are worded more
strongly and contain fewer and narrower exceptions, limitations, and
qualifications. For example, whereas Convention No. 107 "allowed" in-
digenous populations to "retain their own customs and institutions where
these are not incompatible with the national legal system"'87 Convention
No. 169 declares that indigenous peoples "shall have the right to retain
their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible
with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights."8 It also recharacterizes in-
digenous rights as vesting in "indigenous peoples" in contrast to
Convention No. 107's emphasis on "members of indigenous popula-
tions."' 9 It reiterates Convention No. 107's affirmation of indigenous
83. Id. art. 4(c).
84. Id. art. 3(1).
85. Convention No. 169, supra note 7; see Lee Swepston, Indigenous and Tribal Peo-
ples and International Law: Recent Developments, in 30 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 259, 259-
64 (1989) (offering a contemporaneous account of the revision of Convention No. 107).
86. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNA-IONAL LAW 58 (2d ed. 2004).
87. Convention No. 107, supra note 7, art. 7(2).
88. Convention No. 169, supra note 7, art. 8(2).
89. See KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
237-42 (2002) (analyzing the debates during the drafting process on the issue of the vesting of
indigenous rights).
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ownership and possession of traditional lands, 9° but it does so in collec-
tive terms, as vesting in "peoples." It also specifies that such lands "shall
include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of
the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use."'"
In addition, whereas Convention No. 107 conceived of indigenous
protection primarily in terms of non-discrimination, Convention No. 169
strikes a very different balance between non-discrimination and auton-
omy. It does so by placing additional indigenous rights and state
obligations on the international legal register. It provides that indigenous
peoples "shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process
of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual
well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use., 92 It states that
"the rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining
to their lands shall be specially safeguarded," including the "right of
these peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation of
these resources." 3 It requires governments to consult with indigenous
peoples "through appropriate procedures and in particular through their
representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to leg-
islative or administrative measures which may affect them directly."94 It
also requires governments to "establish means for the full development
of these peoples' own institutions and initiatives, and in appropriate
cases provide the resources necessary for this purpose."95
Convention No. 169 also introduces the concept of "self-
recognition" to the field of international indigenous protection. It states
that "self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions
of this Convention apply."96 Self-recognition as a criterion of application
prevents States from claiming that the Convention does not apply to in-
digenous peoples within their midst because they have not been
identified as such by state law or policy. If self-recognition were the sole
criterion of application, then the Convention would vest indigenous
rights in all peoples claiming indigenous status that are located in States
party to its terms. But, self-identification is specified as "a fundamental
criterion," not the sole criterion, which suggests that there are additional
international legal requirements of indigenous recognition in interna-
tional law.
90. Convention No. 107, supra note 7, art. 11.
91. Convention No. 169, supra note 7, art. 13(2).
92. Id. art. 7(1).
93. Id. art. 15(1).
94. Id. art. 61(a).
95. Id. art. 6(c).
96. Id. art. 1(2).
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Convention No. 169's provisions addressing this question are simi-
lar, but not identical, to those contained in Convention No. 107. When
specifying to whom it applies, Convention No. 169 refers to "peoples"
and not to "populations." It refers to "tribal peoples" but not to "semi-
tribal" peoples. It no longer identifies such peoples in terms of "social
and economic conditions" that are at "a less advanced stage" than other
sections of the national community but instead in terms of social and
economic conditions that "distinguish them" from other sections of the
national community. Despite these differences, Convention No. 169 af-
firms what Convention No. 107 declared so strikingly thirty-two years
earlier. International indigenous rights attach to peoples located in "in-
dependent countries." Like Convention No. 107, it states that it applies to
"tribal" and "indigenous" communities. The first are "tribal peoples in
independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and
whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or
traditions or by special laws or regulations., 97 The second are "peoples in
independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of
their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geo-
graphical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or
colonisation or the establishment of present State boundaries." 98 In rela-
tion to this second category, Convention No. 169 replaces Convention
No. 107's requirement that they must "live more in conformity with the
social, economic, and cultural institutions of that time'99 with a less
time-bound requirement that requires them to "retain some or all of their
own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions. ' °° But, for both
conventions, according to either definition, an indigenous community
possesses international indigenous rights because of its historic connec-
tion to territory that now falls under the sovereign authority of an
independent State. Like Convention No. 107, Convention No. 169 condi-
tions international recognition of an indigenous community on
97. Id. art. l(l)(a).
98. Id. art. 1(b). Unlike Convention No. 109, Convention No. 169 provides that indige-
nous peoples include those whose ancestors inhabited the territory "at the time of ... the
establishment of present state boundaries" as well as "at the time of conquest or colonisation
.... " Id. art. l(l)(b). This addition broadens the ancestral links required of an indigenous
community and blurs the distinction, otherwise maintained by the Convention, between in-
digenous and tribal peoples. See KNoP, supra note 89, at 244-45 ("Whereas conquest and
colonization encode the wrong central to a historical argument for the rights of indigenous
peoples, the phrase 'establishment of present state boundaries' is more neutral and could be
seen as diminishing the normative power of the other two.").
99. Convention No. 107, supra note 7, art. l(1)(b).
100. Convention No. 169, supra note 7, art. l(l)(b).
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international recognition of the sovereign status of the jurisdiction in
which that community is located.
Convention No. 169 accordingly comprehends international indige-
nous protection as measures internal to and compatible with the
sovereign authority of the State in which they are located. These internal
measures are no longer to be designed to promote integration; they enti-
tle indigenous peoples to differential treatment to protect their
languages, cultures, and institutions. But, they do assume that indige-
nous people belong to a broader political community and that they share
common citizenship with its other members. Despite the frequent refer-
ence to indigenous peoples, Convention No. 169 makes no reference to a
right of self-determination, which, according to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights' °' and the International Court of
Justice,10 2 vests in all peoples. To foreclose the argument that its refer-
ence to "peoples" links an indigenous population to the right of self-
determination, the Convention stipulates that "the use of the term 'peo-
ples' . .. shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the
rights which may attach to the term under international law."'' 0 3 Thus,
Convention No. 169 continues the trend, begun thirty-two years earlier
by Convention No. 107, of enhancing international indigenous protection
within existing States, while shielding the international distribution of
sovereign power among States from the redistributive potential of the
right of self-determination.
IV.
In contrast to the ILO, the United Nations turned its attention to in-
ternational indigenous rights relatively recently. In 1971, the U.N. Sub-
Commission on the Prevention and Protection of Minorities commis-
sioned a study on "discrimination against indigenous populations."' '° The
resolution commissioning the study, Resolution 1589, echoed the phi-
losophy of integration at the heart of Convention No. 107. It noted that
"indigenous populations often encounter racial prejudice and discrimina-
101. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1,
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (containing identical language).
102. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31, paras. 54-55 (Oct. 16);
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,
1971 I.C.J. 16, 31, para. 52 (June 21).
103. Convention No. 169, supra note 7, art. 1(3).
104. ECOSOC, Res. 1589(L), para. 7, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/5044 (May
21, 1971).
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tion," but it also noted that policies designed to protect indigenous cul-
tures and identities "may, with the passage of time, become unnecessary
or excessive and therefore may also become discriminatory in charac-
ter." 05 It recommended that States review existing legislation providing
indigenous protection to determine whether protective measures are dis-
criminatory, and called on all States to take appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against indigenous populations.' °6 Such meas-
ures should not promote either "segregation" or "assimilation"; instead,
they should promote the "integration of indigenous populations in the
national community."''0 7 "Integration," according to Resolution 1589, is
"the most appropriate means of eliminating discrimination against those
populations."'' 8
The study authorized by Resolution 1589 took twelve years to com-
plete. Known as the Martinez Cobo Report, it provided a comprehensive
analysis of the economic, social, cultural, political, and legal circum-
stances of indigenous peoples, reviewed the merits and demerits of past
and existing measures that States have introduced to protect indigenous
populations in their midst, and made extensive recommendations in rela-
tion to health, housing, education, languages, culture, land, and political,
religious, and equality rights of indigenous peoples. Three features of the
Martinez Cobo Report stand out. First, it proposed distinguishing be-
tween indigenous and non-indigenous communities on the basis of
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial times. It offered
a "working definition" of "indigenous communities, peoples and na-
tions" as "those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion
and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in
those territories, or parts of them."' 9 Second, notwithstanding Resolution
1589's commitment to integration, the Martinez Cobo Report rejected
integration as an overarching objective of international indigenous pro-
tection. It noted "the widespread and open rejection by indigenous
105. Id. pmbl.
106. Id. para. 4.
107. Id. pmbl.
108. Id.
109. ECOSOC, U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues [UNPII], Study of the
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, ch. V, paras. 364, 379-80, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6 (June 20, 1982) (prepared by Jos6 Martfnez Cobo). The
definition also described indigenous communities, peoples, and nations as "non-dominant
sectors of society" determined to maintain and reproduce their cultures, institutions, and legal
systems. Id. para. 379. It also listed criteria for determining historical continuity, including
occupation of ancestral lands, common ancestry, culture, language, and residence. Id. para.
380.
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peoples of the concept of integration,""'  and argued that "[s]elf-
determination, in its many forms, must be recognized as the basic
precondition for the enjoyment by indigenous peoples of their funda-
mental rights and the determination of their own future."" Third, it
recommended the adoption of a U.N. Declaration on indigenous rights as
an interim step to the adoption of an international convention on the
topic."2
The Sub-Commission responded to the Martfnez Cobo Report by es-
tablishing a Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which began
work on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1985.
After extensive consultation and discussion in annual public meetings,
the Working Group submitted a draft to the Sub-Commission eight years
later. "3 Another Working Group eventually produced a subsequent draft
Declaration that met with the approval of the Human Rights Council in
2006.' After some skirmishes, the Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples was finally adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
September of 2007. 5
True to the report that recommended its adoption some twenty-four
years earlier, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples en-
shrines the right of self-determination as its overarching normative
commitment. In distinct contrast with Conventions No. 107 and 169,
which were conspicuously silent on the subject, the Declaration declares
that "indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination," and states
that "[b]y virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
110. ECOSOC, UNPII, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, ch. IX, para. 67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.I (June 10, 1983)
(prepared by Josd Martfnez Cobo).
111. ECOSOC, UNPII, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, ch. XXII, para. 580, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 (Sept. 30, 1983)
(prepared by Jos6 Martfnez Cobo).
112. Id. para. 312.
113. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities,
Working Group on Minorities, Discrimination Against Indigenous People: Technical Review
of the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (Apr. 20, 1994).
114. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council Res. 2006/2, Working Group of the Commission on Hu-
man Rights to Elaborate a Draft Declaration in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the General
Assembly Resolution 49/214 of 23 December 1994 (June 29, 2006), available at http://www.
gcc.ca/pdf/INT000000021 .pdf.
115. One-hundred-and-forty-three countries voted in favor of the Declaration, four voted
against, eleven abstained, and thirty-four States were absent from the vote. Press Release,
General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples;
"Major Step Forward" Towards Human Rights For All, Says President, U.N. Doc. GA/10612
(Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga I 0612.doc.htm. The
four States that voted against were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Id.
Abstaining countries were Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia,
Kenya, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine. Id.
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and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.""16 It
also guarantees numerous, more concrete rights that effectively elaborate
the content of indigenous self-determination."' It enshrines rights of
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and
local affairs," g including "the right to maintain and develop their politi-
cal, economic and social systems or institutions,"" 9 and the right to
maintain and develop their distinct political, economic, social, and cul-
tural identities and characteristics, as well as their legal systems and "to
participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and
cultural life of the State."' 20 It calls on States to recognize, observe, and
enforce treaties that they have entered into with indigenous peoples.' 2
In addition, the Declaration enshrines the right of indigenous peo-
ples to own, develop, control, and use the lands and territories that they
have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used, including the
right to restitution of lands confiscated, occupied, or otherwise taken
without their free and informed consent, with the option of providing
just and fair compensation wherever such return is not possible.12 It also
guarantees indigenous peoples the right not to be subjected to genocide
and the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of
their culture, which it suggests includes any action that deprives them of
their integrity as distinct peoples or their cultural values and identities, or
dispossesses them of their lands, territories, or resources.' 23 Also en-
shrined in the Declaration are the rights to observe, teach, and practice
tribal spiritual and religious traditions; 124 the right to maintain and protect
historical sites, artifacts, and other manifestations of their cultures;' 25 the
right to restitution of spiritual property taken without their free and in-
formed consent, including the right to repatriate Indian human
remains; 26 and the right to protection of sacred places and burial sites. '
116. UNDRIP, supra note 8, art. 3; see also KNoP, supra note 89, at 255-61, 263-71
(analyzing the debates on this issue during the drafting process).
117. For a similar formulation not restricted to the U.N. Declaration, see ANAYA, supra
note 86, at 129 ("[Tjhe principle of self-determination and related human rights precepts un-
dergird more particularized norms concerning indigenous peoples"); see also ALEXANDRA
XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION,
CULTURE AND LAND 109 (2007) ("Central to the draft Declaration is the right of self-
determination.").
118. UNDRIP, supra note 8, art. 4.
119. Id. art. 20(l).
120. Id. art. 5.
121. Id. art. 37.
122. Id. arts. 26, 28.
123. Id. arts. 7(2), 8.
124. Id. art. 12(l).
125. Id. art. 11(1).
126. Id. art. 12(2).
127. Id. arts. 1](1), 12(1).
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In addition, it lists rights of an indigenous people to belong to an indige-
nous nation,1 28 to maintain and use tribal languages and transmit their
oral histories and traditions, 29 to education in their language, and to con-
trol their own educational systems.'3° It also vests extensive rights to
human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, and intellectual prop-
erty.1
31
With its extensive catalogue of indigenous rights and overarching
commitment to indigenous self-determination, the Declaration reorients
international indigenous protection from the relatively even balance be-
tween the principles of non-discrimination and autonomy struck by
Convention No. 169 to one weighted decidedly in favor of autonomy. It
does contain provisions that require States to eliminate discriminatory
measures that disadvantage indigenous people. It declares, for example,
that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the
improvement of their economic and social conditions .... It also calls
for interpretation of its terms in accordance with several principles, in-
cluding equality and non-discrimination. 3 But the real counterweight to
indigenous autonomy in the Declaration is not the principle of non-
discrimination; it is the territorial integrity of States. Reiterating the
principle that validates the status quo distribution of sovereign power, the
Declaration precludes an interpretation of its terms that would authorize
or encourage "any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independ-
ent States."'"
The Declaration thus holds fast to the existing distribution of sover-
eignty and vests indigenous rights in indigenous peoples in light of its
effects. It declares the existence of international indigenous rights, in-
cluding the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination and, in so
doing, comprehends indigenous peoples as international legal actors.
But, indigenous peoples as international legal actors do not occupy the
same international legal plane as sovereign States. When a community is
brought into international legal existence as a State, Kelsen reminds us,
it becomes formally equal to all other States in terms of the legal nature
and scope of its sovereign power. When indigenous communities are
brought into international legal existence as indigenous peoples, they
hold rights that ground obligations which attach primarily to the States
128. Id. art. 9.
129. Id. art. 13(1).
130. Id. art. 14(1).
131. Id. art. 31(1).
132. Id. art. 21.
133. Id. art. 46(3).
134. Id. art. 46(1).
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in which they live. The indigenous rights enshrined in the Declaration,
like those in Conventions No. 107 and 169, presuppose complex and
extensive relations between indigenous peoples and the States in which
they are located. 35 They do not entitle indigenous peoples to acquire
sovereign power as of right. They do not vest sovereignty in indigenous
peoples, as sovereignty is understood in international law. Instead, inter-
national indigenous rights vest in indigenous peoples because
international law vests sovereignty in States.
V.
Unlike Conventions No. 107 and 169, the U.N. Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples does not provide an explicit definition of
"indigenous peoples." Its silence on criteria for determining in whom it
vests rights is to be contrasted with the proliferation of communities that,
since the United Nations turned its attention to the subject in the 1970s,
have politically constituted themselves as indigenous peoples and that
participate in an increasingly influential international indigenous politi-
cal movement.3 6 The deep cultural, geographic, and historical diversities
of communities that identify themselves as indigenous peoples and that
structure the transnational politics of indigenous identity partly explain
why drafters of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples opted not to provide a definition. 37 A definition, it was feared,
would also result in the "dilution of the issue, thus harming the true
beneficiaries of the rights of the declaration."' 38 But, the absence of a
definition in the Declaration, combined with its extensive set of rights,
creates strong incentives for communities to adopt indigenous political
identities in order to benefit from its terms. 139
135. See Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of
Indigenous Peoples' Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 189, 225 (2001) ("Almost all such regimes [like the 1993 U.N. Draft Declaration] pre-
suppose extensive relations between the autonomous [indigenous] institutions and other
government institutions of the [S]tate and between indigenous people and other people within
or outside the autonomous area.").
136. See generally COURTNEY JUNG, THE MORAL FORCE OF INDIGENOUS POLITICS
(2008) (arguing that in contemporary formation of indigenous political identities, indigenous
identity is a political achievement).
137. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414 (1998).
138. ECOSOC, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Report of the Working Group Established in
Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995, para.
28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84 (Jan. 4, 1996).
139. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYs: NAVIGATING THE NEW INTER-
NATIONAL POLITICS OF DIVERSITY 286 (2007) ("[T]oday it is politically advantageous for
substate nationalist groups to adopt the label and rhetoric of indigenous peoples.").
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Which communities should be recognized as indigenous peoples for
the purposes of the Declaration? There are two common, not mutually
exclusive, approaches to this question. The first is to rely on
self-identification. A community that identifies itself as an indigenous
people brings itself into legal existence as such in international law. Re-
call Convention No. 169, which provides that "self-identification as
indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for de-
termining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention
apply.' ' 40 An earlier draft of the Declaration specified that indigenous
peoples have "the right to identify themselves as indigenous and to be
recognized as such." 14' But, some States proposed a strict definition of
indigenous peoples, and, in the end, all that remains of self-identification
in the text of the Declaration is the right of indigenous peoples "to de-
termine their own identity or membership in accordance with their
customs and traditions.',
4 2
Another approach is to rely on recognition by States that populations
within their midst constitute indigenous peoples in international law. On
this approach, States are responsible for determining the international
legal existence of indigenous communities. During the drafting of the
Declaration, for example, China called not only for the Declaration to
contain a definition of indigenous peoples but also a requirement that
indigenous peoples be recognized as such by the States in which they
reside.'4 3 Recall the distinction between constitutive and declaratory
theories of recognition in international law.'" A constitutive theory holds
that a State exists in international law when other States recognize it as
such, whereas a declaratory theory stipulates that a State's international
legal existence is conditional on its possession of the objective attributes
of a State. Treating States as responsible for the international legal exis-
tence of indigenous peoples transposes a constitutive account of state
recognition to the context of indigenous recognition in international law.
It calls on States to both define and apply criteria to determine the inter-
national legal existence of indigenous peoples. A community is not an
140. Convention No. 169, supra note 7, art. 1(2); see supra text accompanying note 97.
141. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities,
Draft U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 8, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.41Sub.21199412/Add.1 (Aug. 26, 1994), in Report of the Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities on its Forty-Sixth Session, at 108, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994).
142. UNDRIP, supra note 8, art. 33.
143. ECOSOC, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Report of the Working Group Established in
Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, para. 37, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/106 (Dec. 15, 1997).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
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indigenous people in international law until a State or group of States
recognizes it as such.
Both of these approaches rely on sources other than international law
to determine whether politically constituted indigenous peoples possess
international legal existence. The first approach relies on indigenous
peoples themselves; the second relies on States. Both fail to contemplate
the possibility that international recognition of indigenous peoples, in
Kelsen's words, is "comprised of two quite distinct acts: a political act
and a legal act.' ' 45 While Kelsen remained influenced by a constitutive
understanding of state recognition, he insisted that legal recognition re-
quires international law itself to supply the criteria for determining the
legal status of a collectivity. By surrendering the task of defining the cri-
teria of international indigenous recognition to a domain beyond
international law, these approaches-like those under Kelsen's critical
gaze-confuse international law with the political projects that it medi-
ates. It is one thing for international law to empower States or
indigenous peoples to decide whether international legal requirements
are met in any given case. This suggests that international law supplies
the criteria of indigenous legal recognition and empowers specific legal
actors to determine whether these criteria are met. It is another to hold
that they possess the power to determine the nature of these require-
ments. This suggests that international law does not regulate
international legal recognition at all-either because States determine
the criteria by which indigenous peoples assume international legal exis-
tence or because indigenous peoples themselves determine their own
international legal status. If there is a difference between international
legal and political recognition, it lies in the capacity of international law
itself to supply the criteria by which to determine the international legal
existence of both States and indigenous peoples.'
46
Benedict Kingsbury offers a third approach, which is to resolve con-
ceptual problems surrounding international legal recognition of
indigenous peoples "in accordance with processes and criteria that vary
among different societies and institutions.' 47 To strive for a precise defi-
nition of "indigenous peoples" that will determine which collectivities
145. Kelsen, supra note 1, at 605.
146. See id. at 610-11. Kelsen noted,
If it were correct that general international law does not itself directly determine the
concept of "[S]tate" but rather leaves the determination to those [S]tates competent
to recognize a community as [S]tate in a given case, then the recognition of [Sjtates
would not be regulated by any norm of international law and hence would not be a
possible subject for codification.
Id.
147. Kingsbury, supra note 137, at 415.
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possess international indigenous rights will do violence to "the fluidity
and dynamism of social life.' '4 8 The fact that indigenous peoples possess
international legal status holds "great normative power" for many com-
munities around the world.149  Determining whether particular
communities possess such status and specifying the nature and scope of
their rights, however, "can be resolved only through specific contextual
decisions, often referring to detailed functional definitions, that are in-
fluenced by, and influence, the more abstract global concept."'
50
Kingsbury points out that the indigenous populations in east, southeast-
ern, and south Asian countries, and to a lesser extent African countries,
have become active in international indigenous politics.' 5' States in
which such populations are located challenge their status as indigenous
peoples in international law on the basis that their historical experiences
of colonization and conquest were radically different than those of in-
digenous populations in the Americas and elsewhere in the world.'52
Kingsbury is right to point out the risks of requiring a precise defini-
tion of indigenous peoples to sort the legal validity of the political claims
of international indigenous status made by diverse communities around
the world. It would be impossible to generate a definition "that is worka-
ble and not grossly under- or overinclusive" or which "is likely to
incorporate justifications and referents that make sense in some societies
but not in others."'53 In place of an overarching definition, Kingsbury
offers four factors as criteria for international legal recognition of in-
digenous peoples: "self-identification as a distinct ethnic group; a
historical experience of... severe disruption, dislocation or exploitation;
long connection with the region; and the wish to retain a distinct iden-
tity.' 54 This approach enables "dynamic processes of negotiation,
politics, legal analysis, institutional decision making and social interac-
tion" to render the "concept" of indigenous peoples "germane to the
enormous variety of local self-conceptions and political contexts to
which its relevance is asserted."' 55
It is difficult to contest that a community merits international legal
attention when it has an abiding connection to the territory in which it
148. See id. at 414 (arguing that the fluidity and dynamism of social life cannot be ade-
quately captured by a universal definition for indigenous people).
149. Id. at 415.
150. Id. at 416. But see PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 33-60 (2002) (examining the suggested differences between indigenous peoples and
other groups).
151. Kingsbury, supra note 137, at 428-36.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 414.
154. Id. at 453.
155. Id. at 457.
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resides, it wishes to maintain its distinctive identity, and it is experienc-
ing severe disruption, dislocation, or exploitation. What is needed is an
explanation of why international legal attention to these attributes and
conditions should assume the legal form of indigenous rights as opposed
to more generic human rights, such as minority rights and rights to cul-
tural protection as well as those that protect civil, political, social, and
economic interests. That the community identifies itself as an indigenous
population does not provide a sufficient explanation of why international
law should recognize it in these terms. Kingsbury's approach, unless
supplemented by an explanation of the normative significance of interna-
tional indigenous rights, risks conflating different forms of international
legal protection into an undifferentiated concern about the disruption or
exploitation of diverse communities of value. Numerical minorities, cul-
tural minorities, national minorities, religious communities, linguistic
communities, impoverished majorities-are we all indigenous peoples
now?
Determining the criteria for legal recognition of indigenous peoples
requires taking an interpretive stand on the nature and purpose of inter-
national indigenous rights themselves. Indigenous rights in international
legal instruments are sometimes interpreted as concrete expressions of
universal rights that inhere in all individuals. Indigenous rights enable
indigenous peoples to effectively enjoy human rights that protect fea-
tures that all of us share. Some of these rights are civil and political in
nature. Others are social, economic, and cultural in nature. Debates
within the ILO during the drafting of Convention No. 107 and its text,
for example, manifest an understanding of indigenous rights as integra-
tive instruments that would enable indigenous people to benefit "fully
from the rights and advantages enjoyed by other elements of the popula-
tion ... *,16 As the U.N. Declaration suggests, international indigenous
rights can also be construed as concrete expressions of a more general
right of self-determination that inheres in all people.'57 From this univer-
sal perspective, the legal significance of the political fact of indigenous
peoples lies in their experience of discriminatory practices that structure
their relations with the broader political communities in which they are
located. Understanding the nature and purpose of international indige-
nous rights in universal terms yields criteria for international indigenous
recognition that focus primarily on the barriers that indigenous peoples
156. Convention No. 107, supra note 7, pmbl. For a review of these debates, see
RODRfGUEZ-PIi&ERO, supra note 39, at 173-211.
157. See ANAYA, supra note 86, at 99 ("[Tihe principle of self-determination arises
within international law's human rights frame and hence benefits human beings as human
beings and ... is presumptively universal in scope and thus must be assumed to benefit all
segments of humanity.") (emphasis in original).
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face in the effective enjoyment of universal human rights, including the
right of self-determination."'
But this universal approach risks losing sight of the international le-
gal instruments that it seeks to vest with normative significance. What
the legal history of international indigenous protection reveals is that
indigenous rights in international law are differentiated rights that recog-
nize differences, partly denied and partly produced by the international
distribution of territorial sovereignty initiated by colonization, that exist
between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. International indige-
nous rights speak to the consequences of organizing international
political reality, including indigenous political reality, into a legal system
that vests sovereign power in certain collectivities and not others. Not
only does this mode of legal organization exclude indigenous peoples
from participating in the distribution of sovereign power that it performs,
it authorizes legal actors to whom it distributes sovereign power-
States-to exercise such power over indigenous peoples and territory to
their detriment. The morally suspect foundations of these baseline legal
entitlements are why indigenous rights merit recognition on the interna-
tional legal register. A failure to respect international indigenous rights,
in the words of Michael Reisman, "reenacts the tragedy of colonial-
ism.
, , 59
International indigenous rights possess normative significance not
because they transcend the contingencies of history and protect universal
features of humanity. Their significance lies in the contingencies of his-
tory itself, namely, in the ways in which international law has organized
international political reality into a legal order. Their international legal
existence is conditional on the formal legal status of the jurisdiction in
which an indigenous population is located-a legal fact underscored by
Convention No. 107. Before Convention No. 107, only colonial popula-
tions were recognized as indigenous populations. The colonial legal
status of the jurisdiction in which a population was located determined
its international legal existence as an indigenous population. After Con-
vention No. 107, only members of indigenous populations of
independent States possess international indigenous rights---entitlements
subsequently extended to indigenous peoples by Convention No. 169
and the U.N. Declaration. The sovereign legal status of the jurisdiction in
which indigenous peoples are located now determines their entitlement
158. But see Kingsbury, supra note 135, at 190 ("Each of these conceptual structures[-
human rights and nondiscrimination claims and self-determination claims-]has its own style
of argument, historical account and canon, patterns of legitimation and delegitimation, institu-
tional adherents, discursive community, and boundary markers.").
159. W. Michael Reisman, Protecting Indigenous Rights in International Arbitration, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 350, 359 (1995).
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to international protection. On either formulation, indigenous recogni-
tion in international law is predicated on the legal nature of the broader
political community in which indigenous peoples are located. Indige-
nous peoples in international law are a function of the structure and
operation of the international legal order.
International law, absent exceptional circumstances, does not stipu-
late that the right of self-determination authorizes an indigenous people
to assert sovereign independence from a State in which it is located. Nor
does it authorize indigenous people to challenge the international legal
validity of the sovereign power to which they are subject on the basis of
its morally suspect origins.'60 But, international indigenous rights miti-
gate some of the adverse consequences of how international law
validates morally suspect colonization projects that participated in the
production of the existing distribution of sovereign power. Indigenous
rights in international law speak to injustices produced by the way in
which the international legal order conceives of sovereignty as a legal
entitlement that it distributes among collectivities that it recognizes as
States. Indigenous peoples in international law are collectivities for
which States must adopt appropriate domestic measures to vest contem-
porary claims of sovereign authority with a modicum of normative
legitimacy.
Interpreting the nature and purpose of international indigenous rights
in these terms sheds light on questions surrounding the criteria for legal
recognition of indigenous peoples. The criteria by which indigenous
peoples can be said to exist in international law relate to their historic
exclusion from the distribution of sovereignty initiated by colonization
that lies at the heart of the international legal order. This does not ex-
clude additional criteria that condition recognition on distinctive
collective identities, experiences of exclusion, dislocation or exploita-
tion, and self-identification. Nor does it preclude international law from
recognizing indigenous peoples in Africa or Asia. It stipulates that the
international legal status of indigenous peoples turns in part on the nor-
mative grounds of the sovereign power of the States in which they are
located. It requires of indigenous peoples claiming international legal
recognition that the sovereign power of the States in which they are lo-
cated is grounded in international law's refusal to recognize their
ancestors as sovereign legal actors.
160. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 845 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1928) ("[A] juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it
.... ").
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Essay has been to illuminate the criteria for in-
digenous recognition in international law. Drawing on Kelsen's classic
essay on recognition of States in international law, it distinguishes be-
tween legal and political recognition based on the extent to which
international law itself provides the criteria for determining the interna-
tional legal status of indigenous peoples. These criteria should be a
function of the nature and purpose of international indigenous rights.
The twentieth-century legal history of international indigenous rights,
from their origins in international protection of indigenous workers in
colonies to their contemporary expression in the U.N. Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, demonstrates that their purpose is to miti-
gate injustices produced by the way in which the international legal
order conceives of sovereignty as a legal entitlement that it distributes
among collectivities that it recognizes as States. The criteria by which
indigenous peoples can be said to exist in international law relate to their
historic exclusion from the distribution of sovereignty initiated by colo-
nization that lies at the heart of the international legal order.
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